Abstract
Introduction
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 the United States began to assert the view that the United Nations Human Rights Council, its predecessor the UN Commission on Human Rights, and the system of ' special procedures ' 1 reporting to both bodies, all lack the competence to examine abuses committed in the context of armed confl icts. This policy is only one part of a broader set of legal arguments advanced by the United States in support of its strategy in the ' war on terror ' , which has challenged various previously accepted interpretations of international law. While much has been written about this topic in terms of substantive law -especially in relation to issues such as jus ad bellum , 2 non-discrimination, 3 and torture 4 -the claim of institutional lack of competence has not been addressed.
Yet the consequences of accepting the claim are far-reaching, especially in terms of undermining the potential effectiveness of the international human rights legal regime in holding governments to account. The number and scope of active armed confl icts in the world today underscore the importance of the issue, but the claim that the ' war on terror ' is a war without any necessary temporal or geographic limitations makes it even more problematic. The United States position is tantamount to suggesting that the monitoring of abuses committed in armed confl icts, and efforts to hold the parties accountable, should be left to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), other non-governmental organizations, and military lawyers. While each of these actors has an important role to play, none are equipped or mandated to hold governments to account systematically or effectively. The ICRC's mandate only rarely permits it to publicly address violations. Military lawyers represent the interests of states and are likely to construe the law in a way which allows a broad scope for military conduct. Even when applying human rights and international humanitarian law conscientiously, they should not be relied upon to provide the only check on military activities. And while some NGOs routinely undertake public evaluations of the legality of particular actions, most are ill-equipped to do so, especially since their access to the necessary information is often very limited. None of these provide a forum in which states and other actors which are not involved in a particular confl ict can exert pressure on the parties to the confl ict to comply with international norms. Excluding armed confl icts from the purview of the Human Rights Council and its special procedures would eliminate the major forum in which governments are most likely to be held to account for abuses committed in that context and thus diminish the likelihood 1 that they would be called upon to justify their conduct publicly and in a systematic manner. It would also be likely to encourage individual governments to put forward very narrow interpretations of the protections accorded the victims of armed confl ict and to encourage the emergence of a wide variety of interpretations of what the relevant standards require in times of armed confl ict.
Claims of institutional competence, or alternatively a lack thereof, are of major importance in international law in general. But they are of even greater importance in the areas of human rights and humanitarian law in which the standards are often relatively open-ended and contingent, thereby rendering crucial the issue of which body will be empowered to apply the given norm to a specifi c fact situation and draw conclusions as to its legality. Indeed, as Martti Koskenniemi has observed, the politics of international law is largely a debate about institutional jurisdiction. In his view, this reality ' refl ects the realization that once one knows which institutions will deal with a matter, one already knows how it will be disposed of ' . 5 The United States' challenge to the institutional competence or jurisdiction of the UN Human Rights Council runs in parallel to its contention that human rights law does not apply during armed confl icts. This article examines both the substantive legal challenge and the institutional challenge through the lens of attempts within the framework of the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council to hold the United States to account for actions taken in the context of what may or may not be characterized as an armed confl ict. It does so with specifi c reference to recent exchanges that have taken place between the United States Government and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions (hereinafter referred to as ' the Special Rapporteur ' ). 6 The article begins by examining the position put forward by the United States as to the proper interpretation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, and by extension, that of the Human Rights Council as a whole. It then analyses each of the component parts of the United States position in light of the relevant law and practice, and concludes by considering some of the implications which would follow if the US position were to be accepted.
The United States' position
The approach adopted by the United States in relation to whether targeted killings of suspected terrorists 7 fall within the competence of the Human Rights Council in Since one of us currently holds the position of Special Rapporteur on this issue, and the other two have worked extensively on the questions in that context, this article draws signifi cantly upon the correspondence exchanged between the Special Rapporteur and the United States Government. It should be noted that the correspondence cited herein is all in the public domain and that discussions between the parties are ongoing in the context of the continuing activities of the Special Rapporteur. general, and of the Special Rapporteur in particular, provides an illuminating case study of questions of substantive law as well as of institutional competence. In schematic form, The United States' position appears to be predicated upon four basic propositions: (1) that the United States government is in a continuing state of armed confl ict with Al Qaida, i.e. that the ' war on terror ' is in fact an armed confl ict in the legal sense and not merely in the rhetorical sense; (2) that international humanitarian law is applicable to situations of armed confl ict and operates in that context to the exclusion of human rights law; (3) that the mandate of the Human Rights Council and thus of its special procedures is limited to international human rights law; and that therefore (4) the Human Rights Council and its special procedures lack competence to address killings taking place within the framework of the United States ' war on terror ' . Before examining each of these propositions in turn it is necessary to consider the context in which the United States and the Special Rapporteur came to exchange views on these issues. The fi rst exchange concerned allegations that six men travelling in a car in Yemen on 3 November 2002 were killed by a missile launched by a United States-controlled predator drone aircraft. The then Special Rapporteur, Asma Jahangir, sent a communication to the US Government on 15 November 2002 querying whether the alleged attack was consistent with applicable international legal norms. In response, the United States replied in detail in a letter which it expressly requested be circulated to all of the members of the Commission on Human Rights as a separate document. 8 This response of 14 April 2003 began by indicating that the Government was not prepared to offer any comment on the specifi c factual allegations contained in the communication or on their accuracy. The reason for this refusal to cooperate was straightforward:
The Government of the United States respectfully submits that inquiries related to allegations stemming from any military operations conducted during the course of an armed confl ict with Al Qaida do not fall within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur.
The United States also disagrees with the premise of the letter and the conclusions contained in the report that military operations against enemy combatants could be regarded as ' extrajudicial executions by consent of Governments ' . The conduct of a government in legitimate military operations, whether against Al Qaida operatives or any other legitimate military target, would be governed by the international law of armed confl ict. After providing a list of terrorist attacks against it that the United States had attributed in whole or in part to the Al Qaida network, 10 the United States concluded that [t] he continuing military operations undertaken against the United States and its nationals by the Al Qaida organization both before and after September 11 necessitate a military response by the armed forces of the United States. To conclude otherwise is to permit an armed group to wage war unlawfully against a sovereign state while precluding that state from defending itself.
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The United States then reviewed the law to be applied in such circumstances:
International humanitarian law is the applicable law in armed confl ict and governs the use of force against legitimate military targets. Accordingly, the law to be applied in the context of an armed confl ict to determine whether an individual was arbitrarily deprived of his or her life is the law and customs of war. Under that body of law, enemy combatants may be attacked unless they have surrendered or are otherwise rendered hors de combat. Al Qaida terrorists who continue to plot attacks against the United States may be lawful subjects of armed attack in appropriate circumstances. Ibid., at 4. 12 Ibid., at 4 -5. 13 Ibid., at 5. laws and customs of war ' . 15 Nevertheless, the US noted that although it was not required to respond to questions posed by a Special Rapporteur outside that Special Rapporteur's mandate it would do so ' in order to correct the record ' . 16 In that regard, it noted that: In some respects, this exchange is a model of the way in which relations between a government and a special procedure mandate-holder should be conducted in the event that there is a dispute not just as to the factual elements of a case but as to the applicable law. The system of communications, more accurately described by reference to another commonly used term -' allegation letters ' -is designed to encourage governments to shed light on specifi c cases and, in the event that human rights have been compromised, to take appropriate remedial action. To a distressing degree, however, the system has tended to degenerate, in the practice of many governments, into a pro forma exchange of correspondence with no serious engagement or response. Thus, in his 2005 report the Special Rapporteur noted that over the preceding year only 54 per cent of communications had received a response of any sort from the governments to whom they had been addressed. Such a response rate was clearly unsatisfactory, a problem which led the Special Rapporteur to adopt several steps designed to enhance the response rate. They included: (i) being more precise in detailing the human rights concerns as well as the measures that governments might consider taking; (ii) reducing the amount of information sought from a government in a particular case in order to ensure that the request was not unduly burdensome; and (iii) classifying the replies according to different categories which would, in effect, evaluate the government's level of responsiveness.
29
The allegation letter sent to the United States on 26 August 2005 followed this approach. In place of the relative generality of previous letters, the questions posed were quite specifi c and carefully targeted to refl ect both the facts of the particular case and the past record of correspondence with the government. Whether this helped to elicit a detailed reply, or whether the government was simply under increasing pressure to defend its prosecution of the ' war on terror ' is not for us to speculate. Either way, the exchange effectively served the purpose of clarifying the position on both sides and bringing the differences into sharper relief. Ideally, the next stage of the procedure will involve a determination of the merits by the Human Rights Council, although the easy way out is to leave matters to be resolved by the passage of time, a highly problematic possibility with regard to acts of questionable legality, since the accumulation of precedents pointing in one direction or the other can work to create international law.
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An Analysis of the Key Elements in the United States ' Position
As noted above, the views expressed by the United States can be divided into four propositions. In this section we will subject each of these to careful scrutiny in light of legal precedents and institutional practice. The fi rst of the propositions, however, can be dealt with rapidly. It is that the United States Government is in a continuing state 29 UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/7, supra note 20, paras 21 -22. 30 In order for such precedents to constitute the opinio juris necessary for the formation of customary law, however, ' [n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by existence of a rule of law requiring it. ' North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1969) 3, at 44, para. 77.
of armed confl ict with Al Qaida. Although it has been argued by a group of fi ve Special Rapporteurs that ' the global struggle against international terrorism does not, as such, constitute an armed confl ict for the purposes of the applicability of international humanitarian law ' , 31 even this position does not preclude the conclusion that, in at least some contexts of the ' war on terror ' , international humanitarian law applies. Thus, we begin with the second proposition which is that international humanitarian law is applicable to situations of armed confl ict and operates to the exclusion of human rights law.
A Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law are Complementary, Not Mutually Exclusive
A commonly accepted starting point for understanding the relationship between international human rights law and international humanitarian law is the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice. In Nuclear Weapons , the Court examined the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law during armed confl ict and concluded that the test of what constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life in the context of hostilities ' falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis , namely, the law applicable in armed confl ict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities ' . 32 The United States has consistently supported the use of this lex specialis test, from its illuminating written submission in Nuclear Weapons 33 through to the present correspondence with the Special Rapporteur. However, its communications and interventions discussed in Section 2 above reveal that it adopts a far broader notion of that test than is generally accepted in international practice, taking the position that, as a general matter, international humanitarian law operates to the complete exclusion of international human rights law in times of armed confl ict. Because the United States also takes the position that international humanitarian law does not fall within the mandate of the Special Rapporteur, the combined result would be that the Special Rapporteur simply has no role at all to play during an armed confl ict.
This section analyses two critical steps in the logic of the United States position, providing an alternative analysis which more clearly frames the operation of the lex specialis test governing the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law as it currently operates in international law. First, we argue that the United States incorrectly interprets the lex specialis test because it applies it at the level of entire legal regimes rather than at the level of individual legal concepts and provisions. That position, we argue, takes the Court's lex specialis language out of context, is inconsistent with the leading study conducted on lex specialis for the International Law Commission, and is even contrary to the United States' own reasoning in its written submission to the Court in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. Second, we argue that, in order to perpetuate this initial error, the United States must ignore or reject the conclusions of numerous authoritative international bodies, including the International Law Commission, subsequent jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, the conclusions of the Human Rights Committee, and the work of the Commission on Human Rights, all of which have found that humanitarian law and human rights law are complementary.
In order to understand why the concept of lex specialis applies to the relationship between individual norms within the human rights and humanitarian law regimes, rather than to the relationship between each regime taken as a whole, one must read the conclusion of the International Court of Justice in context and in its entirety. In the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the Court stated that the arbitrary deprivation of life in armed confl ict ' falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis , namely, the law applicable in armed confl ict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities ' . 34 The United States position appears to be that this statement affi rms the notion that the humanitarian law regime completely displaces the human rights law regime in the context of armed confl ict. This is a misreading of the ICJ's statement on lex specialis because it takes that statement out of context and disregards the rest of the paragraph within which it is couched. Taken in full, that paragraph of Nuclear Weapons says:
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not, however, such a provision. In principle, the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis , namely, the law applicable in armed confl ict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed confl ict and not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself. 35 Thus, the Court asserts in its opening sentence the overriding principle that in fact the Covenant does continue to apply during armed confl ict and specifi cally reiterates that ' the right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities ' . The Court then makes clear that its statement on lex specialis applies at the level of interpreting individual human rights law provisions, such as the prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation of life. The United States has read the lex specialis test to apply so that the entire 34 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 35 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 32 , at 240, para. 25. legal regime of international humanitarian law replaces the entire regime of human rights law during armed confl ict, a position not justifi ed by the text of the Advisory Opinion.
Indeed in its written pleadings to the Court in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion the United States Government advanced this narrower interpretation of the lex specialis test. 36 Rather than argue for a wholesale replacement of human rights law by humanitarian law, the written submission argued for a lex specialis rule which applies at the level of individual provisions, specifi cally with regard to the meaning of ' arbitrary deprivation of life ' in Article 6 of the covenant.
37 This is exactly the application of the lex specialis test that the Court adopted in the Advisory Opinion.
In his exhaustive study on the function and scope of the lex specialis rule carried out for the International Law Commission in the context of his report on the ' fragmentation of international law ' , Martti Koskenniemi put forth a similar analysis. Referring to the passage from the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, he observed:
Even as [the lex specialis test] works so as to justify recourse to an exception, what is being set aside does not vanish altogether. The Court was careful to point out that human rights law continued to apply within armed confl ict. The exception -humanitarian law -only affected one (albeit important) aspect of it, namely the relative assessment of ' arbitrariness ' . The use of the lex specialis test did not intend to suggest that human rights were abolished in war. It did not function in a formal or absolute way but as an aspect of the pragmatics of the Court's reasoning. 38 The Court has subsequently elaborated on its position in a manner consistent with this interpretation. In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory , the Court wrote:
[T]he protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed confl ict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of the kind to be found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As regards the relationship between international humanitarian law and human rights law, there are thus three possible situations: some rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of international law .
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The Court stated this principle of complementarity and the lex specialis test in the same paragraph, with the clear implication that the complementarity principle continues 36 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, Written submission of the United States, supra note 33, at 42 -46. 37 Ibid., at 44 ( ' [T]he prohibition in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights against arbitrarily depriving someone of his or her life was clearly understood by its drafters to exclude the lawful taking of human life. During the negotiation of the text which became article 6, various delegations indicated a preference for including an explicit statement of the circumstances under which the taking of life would not be deemed a violation of the general obligation to protect life, including inter alia killings … which are lawfully committed by the military in time of war. ' ). to operate alongside the lex specialis test. 40 The Court reiterated the above passage on complementarity in the Congo v. Uganda case 41 in which it found separate violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, thus demonstrating conclusively that international humanitarian law does not wholly replace human rights law during an armed confl ict. 42 The signifi cance of this latest judgment should be emphasized on two levels. First, the Court has now adopted its theory of complementarity in a binding contentious case rather than solely in an advisory opinion. Second, the separate violations of humanitarian law and human rights law appear not only in the Court's reasoning, but are also carried forth to the dispositif of the judgment, 43 i.e. the binding part of the judgment which is specifi cally voted upon by judges and enjoys res judicata effect. 44 The views of the International Court of Justice do not stand alone. The position that international humanitarian law operates to the exclusion of human rights law during an armed confl ict is also incompatible with the fi ndings of numerous other authoritative bodies, including the International Law Commission, the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the UN Security Council, the UN General Assembly, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. We turn now to briefl y review the fi ndings of these bodies, to the extent that they relate directly to the assertion put forward by the government of the United States.
First, the current United States position is contrary to the approach adopted by the International Law Commission, which has recently addressed the applicability of human rights law during armed confl ict in its work on the effect of armed confl ict on treaties. In that context, the applicability of human rights law in armed confl ict was separately endorsed by governments, 45 48 In introducing that draft article, the Special Rapporteur noted that its drafting was specifi cally motivated to respond to comments made by the United States on the prior set of draft articles in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly. 49 In those comments, the United States stated explicitly that ' certain human rights and environmental principles did not cease to apply in time of armed confl ict ' . . The fact that it recommended that the material appear in the commentaries, however, makes clear that it views the legal principles themselves as correct. It appears that the move was motivated, rather, out of a feeling that the article was ' strictly speaking, redundant ' . See Report of the International Law Commission at its 59th sess., UN Doc. A/62/10), at 165, para. 299. 49 Ibid ., at p. 11, para. 30, n. 58. Various international tribunals have also concluded not only that human rights law applies during armed confl ict but have even taken the step of applying human rights law directly in their analyses of specifi c confl icts. First, in two cases in 2005, the European Court of Human Rights directly applied the European Convention on Human Rights to the armed confl ict in Chechnya. 56 This approach is consistent with state practice. Although the European Convention -in contrast to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights -allows derogation from the right to life during armed confl icts, no state has ever availed itself of this derogation. Russia, Turkey and the United Kingdom have all defended their conduct in internal armed confl icts by reference to the Convention itself. 57 The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has directly applied the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights to human rights violations in the internal armed confl ict in Chad. 58 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights directly applied the American Convention on Human Rights to the armed confl ict in El Salvador. 59 It also concluded in a different case that ' human rights treaties apply both in peacetime, and during situations of armed confl ict ' . 60 Finally, the recent study on customary international humanitarian law produced under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross concluded that ' [t]here is extensive State practice to the effect that human rights law must be applied during armed confl icts ' . 61 65 It would be inexplicable for the Commission to explicitly endorse this aspect of the report if it considered human rights law inapplicable during armed confl ict or believed such violations were beyond the mandate.
Thus, under existing international law -as interpreted by the International Court of Justice, the International Law Commission, the Human Rights Committee, the Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the International Committee of the Red Cross -human rights law is applied alongside international humanitarian law during armed confl ict. The United States' position, in contrast, is noteworthy in that the United States offers no legal authority in support of its exclusionist thesis. It would presumably be hard pressed to do this without at least contradicting the positions that it has taken clearly and unequivocally in a variety of contexts outside the current framework of the Human Rights Council where its own conduct is potentially being impugned.
B The Mandates of the Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures are not Limited to International Human Rights Law
The position espoused by the United States indicates that not only the Special Rapporteur but also the Commission on Human Rights and its successor the Human Rights Council lack the competence to examine issues of international humanitarian law.
Thus the letter of 4 May 2006 to the Special Rapporteur concerning Haitham alYemeni concluded:
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission and the Special Rapporteur lack competence to address issues of this nature arising under the law of armed confl ict. This assertion is of far-reaching signifi cance inasmuch as it would imply that many of the worst confl ict situations in the world today fall outside the purview of the Council. In the analysis that follows we examine the competence of the Commission, and now the Council, to consider international humanitarian law and then review the competence of the Special Rapporteur in that regard.
The Commission on Human Rights was established in 1946 and for at least the last 20 years of its existence regularly treated international humanitarian law as lying within its remit, and this approach was supported by its parent body, which provides its mandate, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC bring the resolution to the attention of the Government of Israel and to invite it to provide information concerning the extent of its implementation thereof ' .
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As these examples make clear, during the life of the Commission, ECOSOC repeatedly and unequivocally endorsed the proposition that both the legal regime of international humanitarian law and the phenomenon of armed confl ict fell within its competence. It must be conceded that in establishing the new Human Rights Council to replace the Commission, the General Assembly did not include any specifi c language confi rming this competence. 79 While the United States might argue that this omission indicated a wish to step away from, or even reject, previous practice, such a conclusion would need to be supported by some evidence from the relevant debates. Since the issue was never broached, it is more reasonable to assume that the assumption was not questioned by any delegation and that it was simply assumed that the Council would, in this respect as in most others, maintain the practice followed by the Commission.
C The Mandate of the Special Rapporteur is Not Limited to International Human Rights Law
While the previous section of this article sought to demonstrate that the Commission and the Council have consistently asserted the right to consider the implementation of international humanitarian law as well as of human rights law, the question still remains as to whether the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions also extends to both bodies of law. The United States ' position does not contain a systematic or well developed line of reasoning spelling out clearly the grounds on which it opposes such a mandate. Nevertheless, there would seem to be at least three major assumptions underpinning the government's position. The fi rst is that institutions which make up the international human rights machinery are restricted in their focus to the application of human rights law, presumably of both a treaty and customary nature. The second is that any such assumption cannot be displaced or overcome by consistent state practice to the contrary. And a third element is that the development of a consistent practice by the Special Rapporteur of considering international humanitarian law cannot under any circumstances cure the failure of the original mandate accorded by the Commission on Human Rights to 75 Ibid. make explicit reference to that body of law. To a certain extent these elements are all intertwined but we shall nonetheless endeavour to examine them in sequence.
The fi rst element then is that the institutions which make up the international human rights machinery are restricted in their focus to the application of human rights law. Thus, for example, if hypothetically the various treaties constituting the international human rights legal regime did not in fact apply during armed confl ict, then the special procedures and their parent body would lack the competence to respond to those situations. Such an analysis, however, is not straightforward even in relation to a body which is established explicitly for the purpose of monitoring a specifi c treaty. Thus, the Human Rights Committee's direct competence is expressly limited to claims of ' violation by [a] State Party of any of the rights set forth in ' the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 80 But even in that case, this does not exclude the Committee from taking account of a state's obligations under other instruments, including those relating to international humanitarian law, in interpreting its obligations under the Covenant.
81 This is also true of the regional human rights courts, although the range of treaties over which they have jurisdiction varies signifi cantly from court to court. The European Court of Human Rights only has jurisdiction over complaints arising under the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols, whereas the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights both have wider jurisdictions. 82 The conclusion to be drawn from the consistent practice of all of these bodies, consistent with Section 3A above, is that even when an institution does not have jurisdiction over a given body of law, it may still take that law into account in its work in some circumstances. This understanding is illustrated in the 1998 statement by the American Commission on Human Rights which observed that it ' must necessarily look to and apply defi nitional standards and relevant rules of humanitarian law as sources of authoritative guidance in its resolution of … claims alleging violations of the American Convention in combat situations ' . 83 With respect to such bodies as the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council, however, the argument is even less complex. Neither was established as a judicial or quasi-judicial body designed to hear and pass judgment on complaints arising under any particular legal instrument. Instead, each was established to further the UN Charter's general commitment to ' promoting and encouraging respect for human rights ' through a range of activities. 84 This mandate is both logically and historically prior to the question of what treaty obligations states have with respect to human rights. Indeed, the principal international human rights treaties, especially the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, were drafted by the Commission in its early years. 85 The Commission subsequently made frequent reference to these instruments, but it never treated them as self-limitations on its competence in the way that an institution might treat its regulations or by-laws. Thus, for example, in the 1980s when a working group of the Commission drafted the Convention on the Rights of the Child it included an article prohibiting the conscription or recruitment of child soldiers and their participation in confl ict, prohibitions which clearly apply during times of armed confl ict. 86 The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed confl ict, of 2000, further expanded this protection. 87 Thus, the Commission -and now the Council -has always worked to fulfi l its mandate by exercising a broad, Charter-based droit de regard over human rights abuses regardless of whether they violated the treaty obligations of any particular state. 88 One of the most important means by which the Council has exercised its droit de regard is by establishing special procedures in relation to country and thematic mandates.
It is notable that, while the special procedures have invariably drawn on international law both to determine what issues and incidents will be of the most interest to the Commission and Council and to most effectively urge states to end abuses, the special procedures have also drawn on numerous non-binding normative instruments adopted by the Commission and other organs for the same purposes. Indeed, the Commission's resolutions establishing the mandates of special procedures have routinely laid out droits de regard that exceed the scope of legal obligations even for those states that have ratifi ed all relevant treaties. There was, for example, relatively 85 Alston, ' The Commission on Human Rights ' , in P. Alston (ed.), The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal (1992) 126.
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Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 38. It also contains a provision to the effect that ' States Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed confl icts which are relevant to the child ' , thus exemplifying the complementarity between the two regimes. Ibid ., at Art 38(1). As one of us wrote over 15 years ago:
The droit de regard which entitles the United Nations to respond to gross violations of human rights in a wide variety of ways has been fi rmly established in customary international law. … … [I]t is appropriate to ask whether the range of norms which can appropriately be the subject of the scrutiny or [ droit de regard ] is limited in some way -to customary norms, for example. In our view its scope is comprehensive and embraces all of the dimensions of international human rights law. It thus takes full account of customary norms, norms based on authentic interpretation, and general principles and extends also to soft law norms. little explicit international law regarding the rights of internally displaced persons, but this did not prevent the Commission, with the strong support of the United States, from establishing a mandate which has held states to account. More important in the present context is the fact that the normative framework that has evolved with the acquiescence of the United States and the other members of the Commission is by no means confi ned to human rights norms, but draws signifi cantly upon refugee law and international humanitarian law. 89 This greater breadth as compared to treaty bodies is a virtue of the system, which has permitted the Commission and Council to respond to abuses and protect victims even when they are not effectively covered by international human rights law. This is especially helpful if a state's disregard for human rights is refl ected not only in its abuses but also in its decision not to ratify important instruments. In addition, the space between the Commission and Council's droits de regard and the legal obligations of states has proven to be a fertile zone for normative development, pushing forward that aspect of the Commission and Council's mandates and even resulting in the drafting of new normative instruments.
In particular relation to the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, we note that the mandate as defi ned in the resolution creating the post is ' to examine … questions related to summary or arbitrary executions ' , without reference to the specifi c legal framework within which that mandate is to be implemented. 90 The mandate thus has been defi ned in terms of a phenomenon -extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions -that was of concern to the Commission and now to the Council, rather than by reference to a particular legal regime.
A recent review by the Special Rapporteur of the organic evolution of his mandate illustrates the extent to which this evolution has been driven primarily by factors such as demands by states to address specifi c situations or phenomena which were not envisaged explicitly in the original resolution, by the need to respond to new forms of violations, and by increasing public demands for effective responses in specifi c contexts. 91 It has also been affected by the development of new techniques and expectations within the overall human rights regime. This includes the process of expanding the reach of bodies dealing with human rights norms to include also norms of international humanitarian law. This process has been a gradual but inexorable one since the World Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran in 1968. It is not feasible within the present context to undertake a broad-brush review of this development. For further examples involving other mandate-holders acting during armed confl ict with the subsequent approval of the relevant political organs including the Commission on Human Rights and the General Assembly, see the Working paper on the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian evolution specifi cally affected the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions. As the Special Rapporteur concluded in his 2007 review of the overall process of task expansion:
The result is a process of organic evolution which ensures that mandates are not frozen in time and thus unable to respond to new and changing circumstances. This evolution is fully reported in the annual reports of the mandate-holders and those reports are the subject of debate and constant feedback among the various stakeholders. At the end of the day, the Commission or the Council signals its acquiescence in the developments through its response to the reports, traditionally in the form of resolutions. In the vast majority of cases the developments reported are explicitly endorsed by the parent body noting or approving the report and often also requesting the mandate-holder to further develop or strengthen certain measures. 93 This brings us to the third element in the US position which is that the development of a consistent practice of taking account of international humanitarian law in the work of the Special Rapporteur cannot under any circumstances cure the failure of the original mandate accorded by the Commission on Human Rights to make explicit reference to that body of law. This assumption was expressed in the following terms by the United States in its comments of 4 May 2006:
[W]hile the Special Rapporteur may have reported on cases outside of his mandate, this does not give the Special Rapporteur the competence to address such issues.
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Expressed in terms of domestic law one might express the same sentiment by noting that a consistent pattern of ultra vires acts does not cure the original defect. But such a domestic analogy does not work when applied to international law. An integral part of the international legal framework is its dynamic nature and the indispensable role played by state practice in the formation of customary rules including those concerning the development of institutional competences and broader normative evolution. 95 The United States is correct insofar as its goal is to emphasize that the Special Rapporteur alone cannot determine the contours of the legal framework within which the mandate is to be implemented. Nor, of course, can any single government do so. This power is held by the Council and was previously held by the Commission, which reviewed and accepted, discouraged or rejected, the interpretations proposed by successive mandate-holders. The cases below provide illustrative examples in relation to the mandate on extrajudicial executions.
In 1983, in the very fi rst report under the mandate, S. Amos Wako observed that summary and arbitrary executions frequently occur during armed confl icts and that, therefore, international humanitarian law formed an important element of the mandate's legal framework. With that in mind, he included a substantive section on ' Killings in war, armed confl ict, and states of emergency ' under the heading ' International legal standards ' . 96 In that section, after discussing the application of human rights law in accordance with the relevant derogation rules, he notes that ' [t]he Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 are also relevant. … Each of the Geneva Conventions clearly prohibits murder and other acts of violence against protected persons. They explicitly provide that " willful killings " are to be considered " grave breaches " of the Geneva Conventions, that is, war crimes subject to universality of jurisdiction. ' 97 The report was accepted by the Commission. 98 . In January 1992 the same Special Rapporteur published an annex to his annual report entitled ' List of Instruments and other Standards which Constitute the Legal Framework of the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur ' . 99 The Geneva Conventions appear as item three of that 14-point list. This report was accepted in its entirety by the Commission. 100 Moreover, the Commission explicitly ' welcome[d] his recommendations with a view to eliminating extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions ' . 101 These recommendations contained recommendations on extrajudicial executions during armed confl ict.
102 If the Commission did not accept that international humanitarian law formed part of the legal framework within which the mandate is to be implemented, it is diffi cult to understand why the Commission would explicitly endorse recommendations of the Special Rapporteur as to extrajudicial executions in armed confl ict.
In December 1992, Bacre Waly Ndiaye in his fi rst report as Special Rapporteur included a section on ' Violations of the right to life during armed confl icts ' under the heading ' Legal framework within which the mandate of the Special Rapporteur is implemented ' . 103 That section stated that:
[t]he Special Rapporteur receives many allegations concerning extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions during armed confl icts. In considering and acting on such cases, the Special Rapporteur takes into account the 113 This endorsement of the Special Rapporteur's approach under the mandate is unequivocal.
Indeed, the consultative and iterative process by which the mandate has been elaborated and refi ned has been going on for 25 years, frequently in relation to situations of armed confl ict, without a single objection by the United States until 2003. In particular, it raised no objections to the legal framework outlined by Amos Wako and repeated by his various successors over many years and in many reports. Even after the Special Rapporteur raised the issue explicitly in his 2005 report, in a direct challenge to The United States' position, the United States opted not to engage in public discussion, nor, as a member of the Commission, did it call for a rewording of this resolution so as to challenge the conclusions of the annual report. Instead, it made a number of substantive interventions in the debate on the resolution, but none concerning this language. 114 In the vote on the resolution, the United States chose to abstain. 115 After two decades of silence in the face of an unbroken line of Special Rapporteurs explicitly addressing issues of humanitarian law and situations involving armed confl icts, it is diffi cult to think what could lie behind the sudden change of heart other than the fact that the United States saw things differently once its own practices were called into question. It is notable, moreover, that other states have not rushed to support the newly asserted position.
Conclusion
The principal implications of the position adopted since 2003 by the United States on the scope of international human rights law and of the Council's mandate are twofold. The fi rst relates to the accountability of the United States itself while the second concerns the consequences for the international system of accountability as a whole.
In terms of the former, much has already been written about the extent to which the United States has adopted a series of policy approaches, reinforced by legal interpretations, which seem designed to provide it with maximum fl exibility and minimum accountability to enable it to prosecute the ' war on terror ' . Rather than repeating those analyses here, it must suffi ce to note that at the same time as the United States has argued that it is not accountable to the Human Rights Council in relation to these issues, it has also moved to restrict or reject accountability in other contexts and fora. These include its assertion that the ' war on terror ' is an armed confl ict within the meaning of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, that the concept of ' cessation of hostilities ' can be defi ned in an almost entirely open-ended manner, and that treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights can be interpreted so as to avoid responsibility for extraterritorial actions in places such as Guantánamo Bay. Most important for present purposes is its view that armed confl icts of an international scope between a state and a non-state actor such as al Qaeda are not covered by the rules of humanitarian law. 116 The result is that the claim of nonaccountability to the Human Rights Council is then perfectly paralleled by claims as to non-accountability to the other potential mechanisms that might challenge United States actions, thus creating a convenient legal accountability vacuum.
Equally problematic are the consequences of the United States' position for the international human rights regime as a whole. Precisely because experience demonstrates that ' a very high proportion of summary or arbitrary executions occur in situations of armed confl ict ' , 117 the reinterpretation of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur would drastically limit his capacity to provide any protection to individuals in such situations and entirely eliminate his capacity to hold states to account for extrajudicial executions committed in the context of armed confl icts. To the extent that the United States' position would also deny the Special Rapporteur the opportunity to determine whether a particular incident did in fact take place in the context of an armed confl ict, it would additionally enable all governments to avoid scrutiny of killings merely by asserting that they occurred within the context of an armed confl ict.
The scale of these negative consequences is best illustrated by considering some examples of situations of armed confl ict in which the mandate has in the past been able to make a contribution:
• During the Rwandan civil war in 1993, the Special Rapporteur conducted a mission to Rwanda to document extrajudicial executions taking place there. 118 The report of his mission is widely recognized as having sounded the alarm bells of the impending genocide in that country.
• During the armed confl ict between India and Pakistan in 1999, the Special Rapporteur transmitted to the Government of India 13 allegations of violations of the right to life. 120 • Finally, international humanitarian law also applies to situations of occupation. 124 In this regard, the Special Rapporteur has intervened in many cases of alleged targeted killings by Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, including a total of 38 such interventions in 2005 alone. 125 Following the targeted killing of spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin by an Israeli helicopter strike in 2004, the Special Rapporteur sent a communication which elicited a detailed and illuminating response from Israel. 126 It follows from the position advocated by the United States Government that the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions was abusing his or her mandate in addressing each of these situations. It also follows that the Special Rapporteur should cease to consider any allegations of violations received from victims of the confl icts in the Darfur region of Sudan, in Sri Lanka, and in a great many other situations in which widespread and grave abuses of human rights have been reported.
If the United States position is to garner credibility it needs to be asserted in relation to situations beyond those concerning the actions of the United States itself. It is therefore particularly noteworthy that the United States has already started down this road. Thus in the Human Rights Council dialogue following the submission of a joint report on a mission to Israel and Lebanon by four mandate holders, including the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, 127 the United States made the following remarks:
The United States is disappointed that these mandate-holders took it upon themselves to pronounce on complex questions of international humanitarian law. Under the relevant Council resolutions, we fi nd no basis for the mandate-holders to address the conduct of actual military operations or render opinions on whether the parties to the armed confl ict have met their obligations under the law of war. The result is unfortunate, as the Report applies international humanitarian rights law [sic] in areas governed by the law of armed confl ict and offers opinions on the law of armed confl ict that are in some cases dubious and that, in any event, fall outside their mandate. 128 At the end of the day there are several different factors which will determine the sustainability of the position adopted by the United States in relation to the competence of the UN Human Rights Council and its Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions in order to avoid scrutiny of some of its actions in pursuit of the ' war on terror ' . The fi rst is the response of other states within the framework of the Human Rights Council. While various states will be tempted for their own policy reasons to support the United States' position, it seems unlikely that any large coalition will emerge to support that approach. The reason is that any states joining such a coalition would not only be gaining more freedom from accountability for themselves but also removing what few constraints currently exist to temper the political and legal options of the United States in its global actions. The second factor is that the United States itself which itself might come to see that its own interests are best served if multilateral institutions such as the United Nations are able to hold other nations to account for human rights violations committed in the context of armed confl icts. 127 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston; the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, Paul Hunt; 
